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Anticipating Hong Kong's
Constitution from a U.S. Legal
Perspective
John M. Rogers"
ABSTRACT

This Article explores the possible nature of Hong Kong's
Constitutionafter July, 1997, and discusses alternative ways
of interpretingand enforcing the constitution. The authorfirst
proposes three definitionsfor the word "constitution'"(1) how
political power is actually "constituted," (2) a written
document and (3) a referent for disputes. The author then
explains Hong Kong's unusual constitutional status where
Hong Kong will be governed under a written constitution the
Basic Law. and at the same time, many aspects of the Basic
Law will be "guaranteed"by an internationalagreement, the
JointDeclaration. The authorproceeds to evaluate the means
by which domestic bodies, such as thejudiciary, may play a
role in ensuring adherence to the written terms of the Basic
Law. However, because the Standing Committee of China's
National People's Congress retains ultimate interpretative
power, the author proposes that the Joint Declaration may
have more influence on China's actions than Hong Kong's
Basic Law. The author then examines the executive and
legislative structure of Hong Kong and its influence on
political responsiveness in Hong Kong after July, 1997.
Reflecting upon recent Chinese resistance to institutionalized
political responsibility in China, the author suggests that
internationallegal arguments may be the more effective legal
means of ensuringpolitical responsiveness.

* Brown, Todd & Heyburn Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. I
would like to acknowledge the outstanding research assistance of Mr. David
Royse, second-year student, University of Kentucky College of Law. I am also
grateful for the valuable suggestions of my colleagues, Paul Salamanoa and
Richard Ausness.
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I. INTRODUCTION

What will be the constitution of Hong Kong after July,
1997?
As with so many simple questions about China, the terms
here need to be defined and refined to such an extent that the
bottom line answer is not very satisfying. Depending on what is
meant by the word "constitution," the answer to this question Is
either largely unpredictable or relatively insignificant. Coming to
this conclusion, however, can be rewarding, as the path that
takes us inexorably to such an unsatisfying answer can offer an
insightful perspective on the nature of constitutions.
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II. DEFINING WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION

A. Three Different Meanings
The word "constitution" can be defined in three ways: (1)
how the political body is put together; (2) an allocation of powers
and rights in a written document: and (3) a referent for disputes.
In one sense the "constitution" of a political body is simply a
way of stating how the body is put together. It is how the body is

actually "constituted." In this sense every political body, and
A person or
accordingly every state, has a constitution.
institution within the state who effectively exercises a certain
kind of power has such power because of the constitution of that
state. If some document states that the power lies elsewhere,
then the document is to that extent not the constitution as so
defined, since the document does not accurately reflect how the
state is actually constituted.
In another commonly used sense, a "constitution" is simply a
document that allocates powers and rights in a political body.
Thus, there are works that compile constitutions of the world;
works that are collections of such documents.I We can state
meaningfully that the People's Republic of China has, in its
Amendments to a
history, adopted four constitutions.
constitution are amendments to the document. A constitution
consists of words in articles and amendments.
Finally, we can think of a constitution as a kind of
fundamental political agreement. The elements of a political
society that hold power agree that decisions will be made in a
certain way, by certain officials, institutions, or bodies. The
terms of the agreement may be written or not. The agreement
The
may be changed by express or implicit agreement.
implicit
or
express
by
superseded
or
abolished
be
may
agreement
Moreover, the agreement may be violated, even
agreement.
as long as such an agreement serves as a
But
repeatedly.
fundamental referent for disputes among the elements that have
power in the political society, one can speak of it as a
constitution.
In the United States, it is frequently unnecessary to
distinguish among these different meanings of the word
"constitution." This is because the document that is known as the

1.

See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS (Amos J. Peaslee, ed., 4th ed.

1985); CONSTITUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., 1996).
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U.S. Constitution is remarkably consistent with the allocation of
powers and rights that actually exists in the nation, and because
there is widespread acceptance of the idea that the terms of the
document are the ultimate determinant for resolving disputes.
For example, under the U.S. Constitution, may a thirty-yearold individual serve as President of the United States? The
answer is simply "no." There is no need to define precisely the
meaning of the term "U.S. Constitution," since the answer is the
same regardless.
Historically, there has never been political
support for such a young presidential candidate, the terms of the
document prohibit it, 2 and if a thirty-year-old individual was to

run for President, there would be widespread reference to Article
II, section 1 in opposition to the candidacy.
But, assume the following events were to occur. A thirtyyear-old candidate runs for President and is elected. She serves
for four years, fulfilling all the constitutional and legal duties of

President. Legal challenges to her service are unsuccessful
perhaps because the challenges are considered to be "political
questions."3 She is defeated for re-election by another thirtyyear-old candidate four years later. The new President also
carries out the duties of the office. Now the question is asked.
under the U.S. Constitution, may a thirty-year-old individual
serve as President?
The answer depends upon what is meant by the U.S.
Constitution. In the first sense of the term (how power is actually
exercised), the answer, of course, is yes. In the second sense (the
contents of a document), the answer for the objective reader is
doubtless no. 4 In the third sense, the answer depends upon
whether the person or institution answering the question accepts
or rejects the change in a fundamental rule for the society. One
who rejects the change will simply state that the current practice
is a violation of the fundamental societal agreement, which
continues to require that Presidents be at least thirty-five years
old. Such a person, with a full grasp on reality, can argue that
the answer is still no; that under the U.S. Constitution a thirtyyear-old individual may still not be President. There have simply
been a couple of violations of the constitution in that regard. On

2.

U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

3.
Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 n.42 (1969) (reserving
issue of whether a determination by the House of Representatives that a person
elected to the House was underage was a nonjusticiable political question). The
argument might receive some support from Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849) or Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
4.
I recognize that some scholars argue against the very idea of objective
meaning being contained in text. See, e.g., Paul Campos, The ChaoticPseudotext,
94 MICH. L. REV. 2178 (1996).
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the other hand, those who accept the change. no matter what the
reason, effectively have agreed to a modification of the
fundamental agreement about how power should be exercised in
the nation.5
Thus, the answer to a question about the content of the U.S.
Constitution, under the hypothetical, is either yes, no, or "it
depends on political facts," depending in turn upon what the
answering person means by "constitution."
B. U.S. and U.K Constitutions
In order to construct the foregoing example, it was necessary
to hypothesize a plausible situation where no objective body
within the system would have the power to force the practice to
conform to the terms of the document. Thus, there was the need

to assume that the political question doctrine would keep the

courts from finding the practice unconstitutional. 6 An alternative
assumption-less plausible to U.S. citizens-would be that courts
find the practice unconstitutional, but the political branches
simply disregard what the courts hold.
In either of these
situations, the necessity becomes more obvious for the analyst to
attribute precise meaning to the word "constitution" in order to
avoid speaking nonsense.
In contrast, where a written constitution is the ultimate basis
or referent for decisions of an objective body, and powerful
elements of society comply with the decisions of that body, then
we may expect the different meanings of "constitution" to be
conflated. In the United States, we are accustomed to assuming
all three of these conditions. First, we have a written constitution
that is widely assumed to have meaningful content. Second, the
courts interpret the writing and apply it as the highest law.
Finally, those with political power in the United States have
generally acquiesced in decisions of the highest court applying
such interpretations.
Thus, if a foreigner asks a U.S. scholar whether, under the
U.S. Constitution, a person may be criminally prosecuted for
burning the U.S. flag, the scholar could legitimately answer a
simple "no." The text has been interpreted to state "no" by the
U.S. Supreme Court. 7 Despite disagreement by some Supreme

5.

A similar point has often been made by Professor Maier.

See, e.g.,

Harold G. Maier, Customary Practiceand the People's Voice: Separationof Powers
and ForeignAffairs, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 991, 1000 & n.41 (1993).
6.
7.

See supratext accompanying note 3.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Court justices,8 and by the majority of the U.S. Congress, 9
criminal prosecutions for such acts have ceased.
"No" is a
defensible answer whether we mean the U.S. Constitution as text,
referent, or practice.
Not all political entities in the world have systems with the
three characteristics that we often assume about the United
States. Some systems lack a written constitution, notably the
British.10 Others have written constitutions that are not law, in
the sense that courts (or other decision-makers) are not
permitted to apply them directly."
Finally, some systems have
written constitutions, whether or not directly applicable, where
flouting of the provisions is simply not corrected by any person or
institution in the system. 1 2 Such differences demand of any
constitutional discussion a clarification of the meaning of

"constitution."
For instance, take the question of whether a man married to
a divorced woman may serve as King of England under the
British Constitution. If "constitution" means a written document
superior to statutes, then there is no relevant provision one way
or another. If "constitution" means fundamental referent for
disputes, then an observer could argue yes or no. based on the
customs and practices that give content to the "conventions" of
the British constitution. The events of 1937 might serve as a
precedent. 13 A different answer might result if we mean by
"constitution" what power actually gets exercised. If parliament
were to acquiesce in such a marriage. and the King were to
exercise the powers allocated to him under the British system,
then the answer would be yes. Otherwise, presumably not. The
answer under this meaning of "constitution" depends on a
political prediction, which may or may not be governed by stare
dectsis. Apart from what the answer is to these questions, the
point is that as different questions, it is certainly possible that
they might have different answers.

8.
Id. at 421 (Rehnquist. C.J., dissenting, joined by White, J. and
O'Connor, J.); Id. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9.
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988 ed., Supp. I) (held
unconstitutional in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)).

10.

See A.V. DIcEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 28, 32 (10th ed. 1965);

COLIN TURPIN, BRMSH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUION 1 (3rd ed. 1995).
11.
For instance the Japanese Constitution prior to 1946. HIROSHI ODA,
JAPANESE LAW 35 (1992).

12.
See, e.g., Terry Atlas, Clinton Risks a Russian Visit;
January Thp Seen as
Boost to Yeltsin, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1993 (reporting President Clinton's support for
an apparently unconstitutional action by Russian President Boris Yeltsin).
13.
See A.J.P. TAYLOR, ENGLISH HISTORY 1914-1945, 398-403 (1965); E.C.S.
Wade, Introductionto the Study of the Law of the Constitution, in DICEY, supra note
9, at clxvi.
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Without a written constitution, Britain is unusual among
nation-states today.
Not so unusual, however, are written
constitutions that are not directly applicable by courts or other
decision-making bodies. Indeed, until fifty years ago the United
States was almost unique in giving its courts the power to apply
the constitution as law higher than statute or other sources of
law. The theory of a constitution that is applied directly by courts
as the highest law is set forth most famously in Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison.14 Marshall's opinion
relied to a notable extent on the written nature of the U.S.
Constitution:
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution Is
to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the
principles and theory of our government, Is entirely void; is yet, in

practice, completely obligatory.

It would declare, that if the

legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act,
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It
would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence.
with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers
within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that

those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the
greatest
improvement
on political
institutions-a written
constitution-would of itself be sufficient, in America. where
written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for
15
rejecting the construction.

To the modem observer of constitutional systems, however,
the conclusion that a written constitution is inherently a directly
applicable one is a non sequitur. As a matter of logic, a written
constitution could, after all, contain a provision making it not
directly applicable.
As a matter of practice, some written
constitutions are simply not law at all in the sense of being
16
applicable in court.
C. Chinese "Constitutions"
In the People's Republic of China (PRC), for instance, the
written constitution is by its terms supreme, but it is not law in

14.
15.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 178.

16.
See supra text accompanying note 10. Even truly democratic republics
that not only have written constitutions but also have reputations for respecting
human rights have such limits on the direct applicability of their constitutions.
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the sense that it is directly applicable in court.' 7 Instead, the
courts follow the laws of the National People's Congress and the
policies of the government and party.
Those institutions
presumably follow the written constitution, but they also have the
power to amend or supersede it.' 8 In effect, the constitution is a
political, rather than a legal document.
There is nothing
intrinsically wrong about having fundamental political documents
that are not treated as law. The United States, for instance, has
its Declaration of Independence, as well as the party platform for
the party in power.
Such documents may serve important
political purposes without being binding law in form or effect. In
China, for instance, the constitution may tell us more about
recent political trends than about how power will be exercised in
the future. 19 Because of its lack of direct applicability, the
written constitution of China should be read with less expectation

that it either reflects accurately how power is currently allocated,
or serves as the ultimate referent for disputes within the Chinese
system. This alone should not be read as a criticism of the
Chinese constitutional system, any more than it would be a
criticism of the U.S. system to assert that the right to the "pursuit
of happiness" found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence
finds only political implementation and is not a legally
enforceable right.
It does mean, however, that one should exercise care in
assuming the actual significance of compliance or noncompliance with such a constitution. For instance, when the
Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was relatively
new, 20 it was debated whether important aspects of it were
consistent with the constitution of the PRC. 2 1 The argument was

17.

ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 46 (1992); William C. Jones, The Constitution of the
People'sRepublic of China, 63 WASH. UNIv. L.Q. 707, 710 (1985).
18.

XIAN FA [Constitution] ch.3, § 1, art. 62, para. 1, et seq. (The People's

Republic of China).
19.
Ralph H. Folsom et al.. LAW AND POLITICS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 56 (1992); Jones, supra note 17. at 726-28.
20.
Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K.. 23 I.L.M. 1366
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
21.
See Joseph Y.S. Cheng. The Constitutional Relationship Between the
Central Government and the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Govemrnment, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 65, 68 & 68 n.21 (1988) (describing the
raising of these concerns in Hong Kong in 1983 and 1984). Mr. Cheng advocated
a revision of the PRC Constitution to exempt special administrative regions from

certain constitutional provisions, in order to "demonstrate the sincerity of the PRC

leadership and to strengthen the attraction of the 'one country, two systems'
policy to Taiwan." Id. at 70.
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that, despite the allowance of Special Administrative Regions in
Article 3 1,22 the continuance of a capitalist system in Hong Kong
after 1997 would be inconsistent with more general and
comprehensive provisions of the constitution to the effect that the
PRC is a socialist state that "upholds the uniformity and dignity
of the socialist legal system" and that is founded on "socialist
23
public ownership of the means of production."
Now, if the Chinese Government intends to maintain the
capitalist system that has existed in Hong Kong for fifty years, as
the Joint Declaration plainly contemplates, 2 4 it is impossible that
a legal argument based upon its constitution will stop it. If the
Chinese Government intends to renege on its clear assurances to
that effect, it will not be because its constitution requires it to do
so. To maintain a capitalist system or not, then, is a decision

that, once decided, will either be read to conform to the
constitution or have the constitution conformed to it. Indeed, the
argument under Chinese law may have puzzled Chinese policymakers, in light of their government's clear commitment to the
"one country, two systems" concept when the Joint Declaration
was signed. A response to the argument was contained in an
article in People's Daily: "[Slince Article 31 of the Constitution is
an inalienable part of the Constitution, conformity with Article 31
means conformity with the Constitution, and not violating Article
31 means not violating the Constitution."25
While such a

22.
provides:

XIAN FA [Constitution] ch. 1. art. 31 (The People's Republic of China)

The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary.
The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be
prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of
the specific conditions.
23.
XIAN FA [Constitution] ch. 1. arts. 1. 5, & 6 (The People's Republic of
China) provide:
Article 1: The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the
people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the
alliance of workers and peasants.
Article 5: The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist
legal system. No law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall
contravene the Constitution.
Article 6: The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's
Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production,
namely. ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the
working people.
24.
Joint Declaration, para. 3(12), supranote 20, at 1372.
25.
Wang Shuwen (director of the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences), Shell Teble Xingzhengqu shi Woguo de Zhongyao Juece (The
Establishment of Special Administrative Regions is an Important Policy Decision

458

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 30:449

26
response is not logically satisfying to western-trained legalists,
it makes some sense in the Chinese system. It is just a way of
stating that
the question does not make sense within the
27
system.
A more recent example is humorous because of the source.
When the Chinese government announced that it would install an
unelected provisional legislature promptly upon the handover 28a course that at least arguably violates the Joint Declaration 29Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten was arguably in a position of
needing to assure Hong Kong interests that his administration
could live with the inevitable, while not conveying to the Chinese
any official British acceptance of their course of action. He
explicitly acknowledged that the provisional legislature may be
consistent with the Chinese constitution.3 0 Remarkably, this was
taken in Hong Kong as some measure of acceptance of the
provisional legislature, while doubtless connoting little of the sort
to the Chinese.

D. Hybrid Systems

Between the two poles of direct applicability contemplated In
Marbury and exclusively indirect or political applicability
exemplified in China is the hybrid example of those states where
only one specialized court has the power to apply the constitution
as highest law.
Examples are Germany and Italy, whose
specialized constitutional courts alone have the power to find
statutes unconstitutional. 3 1 Much can be said in favor of such
systems. For instance, one could argue that if the national
legislature reads the constitution one way, and a local judge
reads it another way, the national legislature's reading should
of our Country), Renmin Rlbao [People's Daily], Sept. 28, 1984, as summarized by

Joseph Y.S. Cheng of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Cheng, supra note 21.
at 70.
26.
In Joseph Y.S. Cheng's marvelous understatement the "argument
appears simple and reassuring, though not necessarily logical." Id. at 70.
27.
According to Douglas Hofstadter when Zen monk Joshu was asked by
another monk whether a dog has a Buddha-nature or not, Joshu answered "mu,"
thereby effectively "unasking" the question. DOUGLAS R HOFSTADTER ET AL.. BACH:

AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 233 (1979). In doing so. Joshu "let the other monk know
that only by not asking such questions can one know the answer to them." Id.
28.
Catherine Ng et al., Black Day for Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST.
Mar. 25, 1996, 1996 WL 3755071.
29.
See Joint Declaration, Annex I. art. I, para. 3. See Philip Wong &
Carmen Cheung, Democrats to go Ahead with Legislature Littgation, HONG KONG
STD., Sept. 11, 1996, 1996 WL 11716371.
30.
Governor's Question-and-Answer Session in the Legislative Council,
Apr. 18. 1996, http://www.info.gov.k/isd/news/apr96/18qa.htm, p. 6.
31.
Grundgesetz [Constitution] art. 93 (Germany); LA COSTITUZONE
[Constitution] art. 134 (Italy).
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prevail, at least until a broadly representative legal body, with a
While the
national mandate, concludes to the contrary.
constitutional court in such a system is presumably composed of
legally trained persons largely independent from the rest of the
government, it is only the judicial nature of the body that
distinguishes such a system from the Chinese model. The theory
of Marbury, that the constitution is simply the highest law, to be
applied by those who apply law, is necessarily absent.
Each country must determine the extent to which any
written constitution that it may have will serve as its law. The
more that a country does so, the more one can treat
interchangeably the notions of a constitution as written
document, reflection of actual allocation of powers, and
fundamental political agreement. It is necessary to focus on the
different meanings of constitution, however, in order to anticipate
the future constitutional status of Hong Kong.
III. THE FUTURE

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF HONG KONG

Great Britain and China agreed to the 1997 handover of
Hong Kong in the Joint Declaration of 1984.32

The Joint

Declaration provided that Hong Kong would retain important

aspects of its legal and economic systems for fifty years following

the handover. 3 3 A Basic Law, promulgated by the Chinese
Government, consistent with the Joint Declaration, would serve
as the legal charter for the territory, which would be called a
34
"Special Administrative Region" (SAR) of the PRC.

The Basic

SAR was adopted by the National People's
Law for the Hong Kong
3
Congress in 1990.

5

In the return of Hong Kong to China one sees a remarkable
amalgam of systems. U.S. citizens, whose legal perspective is
presumably imbued with the conceptual framework of Marbury v.
Madison, must be doubly cautious. Hong Kong has been a colony
under the sovereignty of the British crown, 3 6 and Britain, in turn,
has an unwritten constitution in which Parliament is
See generally John H. Henderson, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into
32.
the People's Republic of China: What It Means to Hong Kong's Future Prosperity, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 511-27 (1995).

33.
34.
35.

Joint Declaration, Annex I, Part I, supranote 20, at 1373.
Joint Declaration, para. 3(12), supranote 20, at 1372.
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the

People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1988. 29 I.L.M. 1520 [hereinafter Basic Law].
For a helpful description, see Henderson, supranote 32, at 528-30.
36.

PETER WEsLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG

KONG 23-38 (2d ed. 1994).
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"supreme." 3 7 Hong Kong has a charter in the form of Letters
Patent and Royal Instructions, 3 8 and a body of laws imposed by
the British Parliament directly and indirectly through the
legislative bodies of the colony. 3 9 However, typically in the case
of decolonization from Britain, the former colony develops a
written constitution (as in the United States) or has a written
constitution passed for it (as in the British North America Act.
Canada's constitution that was "patriated" in 1982)40 that is
directly applicable, at least at the outset of independence. In
courts that are set up to be somewhat independent. Such a
constitution may evolve, or get superseded, in response to power
interests within the territory, with the result that former British
colonies now range in form from multi-party democratic republics
like Canada, India, and Australia, to one-party states like
Zimbabwe, to military dictatorships like Myanmar. It may not be
clear at the time of decolonization how the constitution of a
former British colony will develop, but the result can generally be
said to be a product of the interplay of power interests within the
territory.
Hong Kong will be different in two important respects, which
generally cut in opposite directions. First, Hong Kong is being
given a constitution (the Basic Law) that is similar to the charter
of a former British colony, but which is from the outset being
placed subordinate to a sovereignty that simply does not treat
written constitutions in the way that common law scholars are
used to thinking about them.4 1 This factor suggests lessened
expectation that the written constitution (the Basic Law) will
reflect political reality or serve as a referent for resolving disputes.
Second, and conversely, many aspects of the Basic Law are
guaranteed in effect by an international agreement, the Joint
Declaration, to which the succeeding sovereign is bound. This
distinguishes Hong Kong's post-decolonization constitution from
those of other former British colonies, and provides a test for the
relative efficacy of international, as opposed to domestic, law in
maintaining the effectiveness of written constitutional provisions.
To the extent that this factor operates, it suggests greater
expectation that the Basic Law will reflect political reality or serve
as a referent for resolving disputes.
Of course, the final answer to what the political reality will be
in Hong Kong depends upon how the Chinese government
exercises its power. At the pessimistic end of the range of

37.
38.

Id. at 171-86.
1& at 42.

39.

Id.

40.
41.

SeeTURPIN, supranote 10, at 93-101.
See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
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possibilities is a form-over-substance reality of total political
control and repression, coupled with economic milking and
rampant corruption and only the merest token of compliance with
the forms of the Basic Law. At the optimistic opposite end of the
range is a simple change in flags, coins, and stamps, with Beijing
merely acting in effect as a new, benevolent, distant colonial
power. Neither extreme is likely, but where along the spectrum
the Chinese government will settle depends largely on political
factors beyond the scope of this Article. Among these factors are
the ability of the central Chinese government to control enormous
Chinese interest in tapping into Hong Kong's prosperity, the
degree of sensitivity to expressions of political discontent that
simply would not be tolerated in the rest of China, the need to
encourage world business confidence in Hong Kong, and the need
to provide a model for the possible return of Taiwan to central
government control.
In contrast to the weight of inherently political factors, legal
protections for preserving a constitutional system reflected by the
Basic Law-the subject of this Article-pale in comparison. But
there are different shades of pale. The type of protection to which
common law lawyers are accustomed-an independent judiciary
with an overarching mandate-is fundamentally and uniquely
handicapped from the outset. The type of law in which common
law lawyers are less accustomed to putting their faith-public
international law-may in contrast carry at least some weight.

IV. THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY AND THE BASIC LAW

A. GeneralView of the Judiciary
The official position of the British Government is that the
judicial system of Hong Kong will change very little after 1997.42
Article 19 of the Basic Law provides that the Hong Kong SAR
42.

According to the Hong Kong Government Information Centre:

As in other areas of Hong Kong's life, there will be very few changes to the
Judiciary with the change of sovereignty in 1997. The one significant
change actually enhances it, namely. final appeal will no longer lie to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, but to a new Court of
Final Appeal located in Hong Kong. In all other major respects the judicial
system will remain as it is, as guaranteed by the Joint Declaration and
Basic Law, which has specific articles ensuring the independence of the
Judiciary, the continuation of the common law and trial by jury, etc.
<Http://www.info.gov.hk/info/fjudic.htm#changes>.
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"shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication." 4 3 Section 4, moreover, contains a number
of provisions that seem to describe an independent judiciary with
the power to apply the Basic Law directly. The power of "final
adjudication" for the SAR will be vested in the Court of Final
Appeal (CFA) of the SAR, "which may as required invite judges
from other common law jurisdictions to sit."4 4 The structure,
powers, and functions of the Hong Kong courts are to be
prescribed by law,45 and the courts are to adjudicate cases in
accordance with the Basic Law itself, local laws previously In
force and those subsequently enacted by the SAR legislature, and
the common law, 4 6 for which the courts may look to "precedents
of other common law jurisdictions."4 7 The courts shall exercise
power "independently, free from any interference," and judges
shall be "immune from legal action in the performance of their
Trial by jury, speedy trial, and the
judicial functions."4 8
presumption of innocence are preserved. 4 9 Judges of the CFA are
to be appointed by the SAR Chief Executive on the
recommendation of an independent commission, and subject to
They may be
the endorsement of the Legislative Council.5 0
removed only for inability to discharge duties or misbehavior, and
5
then only on the recommendation of a tribunal of judges. 1
The CFA was intended to be a substitute for the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, which has served as the final
appeal court for Hong Kong, other colonies, and some dominions
of the British Commonwealth.5 2 The Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council is composed of law lords of the British House of
Lords.5 3 To conform the Hong Kong CFA in one significant
respect to the model of the Privy Council, the Basic Law provides
for the possibility of inviting "judges from other common law
jurisdictions to sit on the Court of Final Appeal." 5 4 Perhaps the
most controversial question regarding the implementation of the
CFA provisions of the Basic Law has been the question of how

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Basic Law. supranote 35, art. 19.
Id. art. 82.
Id. art. 83.
Id. arts. 8, 18, 84.
Id. arl 84.
Id. art. 85.
Id. arts. 86, 87.
Id. arts. 88, 90.
Id. art. 89.
WESLEY-SMITH, supranote 36.
Id. at 140.
Basic Law, supranote 35. art. 82.
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many non-Hong Kong judges may sit on the CFA.5 5

The issue

was essentially a question of how much the CFA might resemble
a commonwealth court like the Privy Council as opposed to a
local court. The controversy was stirred by an unpublished 1991
agreement between Britain and China that there would be five
members of the CFA, at most one of whom would be a judge from
another common law jurisdiction in any particular case. 5 6 The
Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) voted against a bill to
implement the 1991 agreement in December, 1991, largely on the
basis of the limit on the number of foreign judges. 5 7 Ultimately,
following three years of controversy, Britain in June, 1995,
announced its continued acceptance of the principle that no more
than one foreign judge would sit in any particular case. 5 8 The bill

to establish the CFA was pushed through the Hong Kong
Legislative Council by the British Administration in Hong Kong in
1996 on the theory that the only alternative was a judicial
vacuum. 5 9 The bill further disappointed democracy advocates in
Hong Kong by reaffirming an "act of state" exception to the

jurisdiction of the CFA, and delaying the start of the CFA's
function until after the handover of Hong Kong in July, 1997.60
B. InterpretationandApplicability of Basic Law
While persons in Hong Kong concerned about the
independence of Hong Kong's legal system have focused their
attention on the outside jurist controversy, and to a lesser extent
on the exception for acts of state and the CFA startup date, there
is an element of Hong Kong's Basic Law that is probably far more
significant. That is Article 158, which expressly gives the "power
of interpretation" of the Basic Law to the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress. 6 1 The same article makes the
55.
See Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal Still in Dispute, Reuters News
Agency, Mar. 23, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
56.
WESLEY-SMrrH, supra note 36, at 74. The agreement was leaked but
not officially publicized in 1991. According to China's official news agency, the
1991 agreement was "revealed for the first time" by China's top official on Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs in May 1995. Lu Ping on HK's Court of Final Appeal,
Xinhua News Agency, May 18, 1995. available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File.
57.
Emily Lau. Testing Time for Political Players, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POsT. July 24, 1995, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, S.China File.
58.
Simon Holberton. China and UK Agree over Supreme Court, THE TIMES,
June 9. 1995, at 6.
59.
Peter Stein & Marcus W. Brauchli, London and Beffing Agree on High
Courtfor Hong Kong, WALL ST. J. EURO., June 12, 1995.
60.
Id.
61.
Basic Law. supranote 35, art. 158.
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Basic Law directly applicable by the courts of Hong Kong,
including the CFA and lower courts, but,
if the courts of the Region. in adjudicating cases, need to interpret
the- provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People's Government. or concerning
the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region.
and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases.
the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judgments
which are not appealable. seek an interpretation of the relevant
provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When
the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions
concerned, the courts of the Region. in applying those provisions.
shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee.
62
However. judgments previously rendered shall not be affected.

Compare the likelihood that the Basic Law will be descriptive of
the future constitutional order with the likelihood that a
hypothetical Basic Law without such an interpretation provision
would be so descriptive: In either case. an exercise of power in
conflict with the Basic Law, if accepted by the elements with
power in society, will change the "actual" or effective
"constitution." But judges, because of their perceived legitimacy,
can also provide evaluations which serve as a very persuasive
part of that power process. Their statement that a power exercise
is contrary to law may induce some elements in society to accept
that position and reject the exercise of power. The more this

occurs, the greater the congruity of written constitution and
effective constitution.

It is unlikely to occur at all, however, and

arguably impossible, when the written constitution contains a
potentially self-destructing mechanism like Article 158 of Hong
Kong's Basic Law.
Support for this argument is found by comparing Professor
Tayyub Mahmud's fascinating study of pre-existing national
courts in other formerly British territories faced with new
constitutions declared following coups d'etat.6 3
Mahmud
surveyed judicial responses to coups d'etat in eleven post-colonial
common law settings: Pakistan, Ghana, Southern Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), Uganda, Nigeria, Cyprus, Seychelles, Grenada,
Lesotho, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana. Each of these places
had at one time been under the British crown, and each had a
written constitution under which judges were appointed who later
had to rule on the validity of actions that unquestionably violated
those written constitutions: wholesale usurpations of power

62.
Id. In addition, under Article 159, the National People's Congress has
the power to amend the Basic Law. Id. art. 159.
63.
Tayyab Mahmud, Jurispndence of Successful Treason: Coup d'Etat &
Common Law. 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 49 (1994).
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outside the requirements of the written constitutions. In virtually
64
every instance, the court validated the actions of the usurpers,
at least where the usurpers continued in power at the time of the
court decisions.
Mahmud identifies four options available to a judge when
confronted with a successful coup: "(i) validate the usurpation of
power; (ii) declare the usurpation unconstitutional and hence
invalid; (i) resign ... ; or (iv) declare the issue a nonjusticiable
political question."6 5
Mahmud criticizes the theoretical
underpinnings for the first option of validating the usurpation.
even though it is the option which has historically been the most
frequently exercised. His critique is strong, and only partially
captured by the following summation: there is more than one
sense to the word constitution. and the fact that political power
has put a new constitution into effect does not mean that the new
66
constitution is valid within the system of the old constitution.
Mahmud also criticizes the second, and opposite option, strict
constitutionalism, as one that would render the court practically
irrelevant, and perhaps endanger the judges. Mahmud criticizes
the third option, resignation, on similar grounds, 6 7 and moreover,
resignation is essentially only available to a judge and not to a
court. Mahmud advocates the fourth option. declaring the issue
of the validity of the usurpation of power to be a nonjusticiable
political question. 6 8
This course would "deny judicially
pronounced legitimacy to the usurpers without jeopardizing the
69
very existence of the courts."
Mahmud's argument is that the political question doctrine
should be applied extra-constitutionally. That is. the doctrine
should apply even if the previous constitution had clearly
precluded application of the doctrine. It may be confusing to use
the "political question" term of art at this level. The political
question doctrine in the United States, sparingly used and
heavily criticized though never overruled, is a doctrine that by
hypothesis is consistent with the constitution and accordingly
This is
implies acceptance of the political status quo.

64.

In the middle of three succeeding instances in which this type of

scenario played out in Pakistan, the Pakistani Supreme Court invalidated the
assumption of power by the military in 1969. Mahmud, supra note 61, at 73-76.
By the time that the case was decided, it should be noted, the military regime had
fallen and been replaced by an elected regime. Id. at 75. In the other coups
examined by Mahmud, the courts validated the incumbent usurper regimes.
65.
Id. at 100.
66.
Id. at 133.
67.
Id. at 128-29.
68.
Id. at 131-38.
69.
Id. at 139-40.

466

VA1NDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 30:449

demonstrated by the fact that while application of the doctrine
usually means dismissing the case against the government, in
some other court contexts, application of the doctrine might

mean providing relief based on the action of a political branch of
the government. 7 0 This is warranted as a matter of constitutional
law because the basis for the political question doctrine can be
found in, or inferred from, the Constitution. 7 1 By way of
contrast, if the U.S. Constitution expressly rejected the political
question doctrine, then the Supreme Court could not
constitutionally apply it. Thus, exercise of the political question
option amounts to an acceptance of the new political order unless
that option is permitted by the old order. But if the latter option
is permitted, the court simply does not have to decide and can
rule comfortably in conformity with strict constitutionalism,
Mahmud's second option.
To apply the "political question" doctrine at the extraconstitutional level-in contravention of the earlier constitutionthus essentially amounts to acceptance of the new constitutional
order. This is because the court will be giving effect to actions
that would not be given effect under the old constitutional
order.72
Applying the political question doctrine extraconstitutionally is thus simply a way to accept the new order.
But for the conscientious judge, who is concerned about the
moral obligation to comply with his or her oath, and who finds
the new order not to be legitimate (as a political or moral matter),
strict constitutionalism is the proper answer.
Deciding whether to accept a new constitutional order,
therefore, ultimately depends upon political and moral value
judgments. It is, accordingly, impossible to tell judges in advance
whether it is better to uphold a usurpation or apply the political
question doctrine, or to resign or apply the old constitution
strictly. The choice is a political and moral one to be made by the
members of the polity, including the judges. Therefore, it cannot
be made in advance by legal analysis. An inherently political and
moral decision requires an examination of factors including:
whether the old or new regime is corrupt; whether the old or new

70.
For instance, in First National City Bank v. Banco Naclonal de Cuba,
406 U.S. 759 (1972), five Supreme Court justices characterized the Act of State
Doctrine (which can serve to permit plaintiffs to recover, as In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)) as an application of the political question
doctrine. 406 U.S. at 772 (Douglas. J.. concurring); 406 U.S. at 787-88 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
71.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.
72.
Thus, the court in R. v. Ndhlovu, 1968 (4) SALR 515, 520-21(A), which
accepted the new order in power at that time in Rhodesia, relied heavily on Luther
v. Borden. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), which Mahmud relies upon to support his
use of the political question doctrine.
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regime has popular support; whether the old or new regime better
serves the interest of the state; whether an oath to support a
subsequently corrupted regime is binding; and whether
resistance against the new regime is futile. These are political
and moral questions, of course, but every public servant is faced
with them when a revolution occurs. Compare Robert E. Lee's
dilemma as to whether to lead the Union or Confederate Army in
1861. It is the polity of a state that ultimately determines what
constitution a state has. 73 A judge may be an important part of
the polity that must decide whether or not to accept the new
order. The judge must decide to accept the new order or not, just
as the ministry officials and military leaders must make the same
decision.
The cases examined by Mahmud show that common law
judges almost always have ruled to uphold extra-constitutional
assertions of power in the context of wholesale coups d'etat. On
the other hand, in the context of smaller scale exercises of power
in contravention of a written constitution, common law courts
may more often rule against such exercise. Indeed, in a sense
this occurs every time the U.S. Supreme Court or a European
constitutional court invalidates a statute or executive action. But
whether wholesale or smaller scale unconstitutionality, the
choices outlined by Mahmud are the same.
How much can law insure that the content of the Basic Law
of Hong Kong will also reflect the political reality in Hong Kong?
Or similarly, how much can law insure that a particular written

constitution will stay in effect in any common law jurisdiction?
Of course, as long as political interests act in conformity with the
constitution, the written constitution will correspondingly
coincide with the actual exercise of power. In this situation, a
legal check is unnecessary. When political interests violate the
written constitution, the legal check consists of a declaration of
illegality by an objective, respected body, and the possibility that
the political interests will defer to the decision. The legal check
does not always work, as the coup cases show. However, it only
can work if judges assert the unconstitutionality of political
action, and there is enough political will in the polity to demand
compliance with the decision. In terms of political reality in the
nations of the world, this legal check may seem small, but it may
serve to increase, at least marginally, the expectation that a

73.
See John M. Rogers & Robert Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law
from Self-Referential Problems in Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. Rsv. 992, 1003-06
(1992).
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particular written constitution will reflect the real exercise of
power.
Even that marginal increase in assurance is destroyed.
however, if the objective body (court) is disempowered under the
written constitution from making such a declaration of invalidity.
The grant of final interpretative power to the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress effectively does this.
This is not an argument that words can have any meaning,
and serve as no constraint on persons interpreting them. 7 4 But
any body with final interpretative power has discretion to make
more than one interpretation, and one text can support a range of
meanings. The narrowness of the range may depend significantly
on the shared assumptions of professional and national culture,
as well as the extent to which the decision-maker is motivated by
logic as opposed to political pressure or interest. The Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress is a political body7 5
in a government composed of persons with concepts of ideology,
government, and law different from those who live and operate in
nonsocialist republics. 76 It is, moreover, an arm of the very
political power that has the strongest interest in, and capability
of, of exceeding the limits of the Basic Law.
While the latter part of this Article deals with structural
constitutional issues, and leaves civil rights issues to others, an
example involving civil rights of individuals shows the extent to
which the interpretive power undermines the effective legal force
of the written Basic Law. Suppose a resident of Hong Kong, after
the handover, expresses a political point of view contrary to that
of the Chinese government. For instance, suppose a protester
holds a sign up in a Hong Kong park saying that Taiwan should
be admitted to the United Nations. 7 7 Or a businessman writes a
letter to a Hong Kong paper saying that Tibet should be
independent from China. Or a lawyer in a television interview

74.
Indeed, this very paper has assumed that a written constitution has
meaningful content.
75.
See Jones, supra note 17, at 710; KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING
CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 162 (1995); see also Owen M. Fiss, Two
Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492, 496 (1986).

76.
See Janet E. Ainsworth, On Seeing Chinese Law from the Chinese Point
of View: An Appreciative Look at the Scholarly Careerof ProfessorWilliam Jones, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 547, 556-57 (1996).
77.
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has been quoted as warning
that "Hong Kong should not hold political activities which directly interfere in the
affairs of the mainland." See China News Digest, Global Ed., Oct. 21, 1996
(reporting the public outcry resulting from the remarks). Hong Kong Secretary of
Justice-Designate Elsie Leung is reported to have said that slogans such as "Down
with Deng Xiaoping!" will be illegal In Hong Kong after July 1, 1997. Anti-Chinese
Leader Slogans Illegal in Hong Kong after July 1, China News Digest, Global Ed.,
Feb. 28, 1997.
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sharply criticizes China's insistence on replacing the LegCo
elected democratically under the British with an unelected
Suppose that the SAR government,
Provisional Legislature.
under pressure or direction from Beijing, punishes such activity,
criminal prosecution. or through
either through arrest and
78
administrative retaliation.
The question is not whether such punishment might come
about, but rather what effect the legal system will have on
whether it does. The Basic Law will be the law of Hong Kong, and
the Basic Law states, "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of
speech, of the press and of publication: freedom of association, of
assembly, of procession and of demonstration." 7 9 In addition,
Article 39 requires that the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IICCPR] shall remain in
force and "be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region."8 0 Moreover, "[the rights and
freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted
unless as prescribed by law," and such restrictions may not
contravene the ICCPR. 8 1 These provisions suggest that the SAR
would not have the power under the Basic Law to punish the
political expressions hypothesized above. Of course, one could
argue that the right to free speech in Hong Kong is qualified by
the need for national unity and political stability. The preamble
to the Basic Law states that the establishment of the SAR is
based upon "[uipholding national unity and territorial integrity,"
82
and "maintaining the prosperity and stability" of Hong Kong.
Objectively speaking, one may conclude that the Basic Law
protects the activities described. An exception for speech that is
inconsistent with government political positions would appear to
eviscerate the protection. There would not even be core content
to the freedom set forth in the Basic Law. A legal conclusion
therefore certainly could be that these activities are protected.
How could such a conclusion affect the real allocation of
powers under the actual SAR? If an objective and independent
legal body makes the determination that the Basic Law is
violated, it may be somewhat harder for the SAR to carry out the

78.

Jimmy Lai, a majority shareholder of the highly popular Giordano

clothing chain, spoke out against Li Peng in a magazine editorial, referring to Peng

as a tortoise egg with a zero IQ. Almost immediately, Giordano stores in China
began to be shut down by the government, forcing Lai to bow out of his top
position at Giordano and surrender his voting rights in order to save the company.
THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1994, at 6.
Basic Law, supra note 35, art. 27.
79.
80.
Id. art. 39.
81.
IC.
I& Preamble.
82.
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act of punishment. Some respectability for the SAR would be lost
if an official ann of the government, one that has some credibility
with the polity as a whole, declares a violation of the Basic Law.
Now, whether the CFA will be a body with such credibility has
been the focus of disputes regarding how the judges will be
appointed, and whether more than one judge can be from another
common law jurisdiction. The history in the cases of coups d'etat
shows that judges may accept wholesale exercises of brute
political power. It may be a lot to expect judges of the CFA to
defy the exercise of political power by the new sovereign. But
only if they are willing to do so, at least in particular-as opposed
to wholesale-violations, can it be said that an objectively
determined content of the law will be the real content of the
exercise of political power.
Assume for the moment that the CFA is composed of the
wisest, the most analytical, the most courageous, and the most
independent of judges imaginable. They still can apply the Basic
Law to invalidate a political exercise of power only If the Basic
Law is directly applicable. This does not appear to be a problem.
It may be that the ICCPR is not directly applicable, since Article
39 states that it "shall be implemented through the laws" of the
SAR, 8 3 but the freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 27 Is
accompanied by no such limitation. More explicitly. Article 84
provides that the courts of the SAR "shall adjudicate cases in
accordance with the laws applicable in the Region as prescribed
in Article 18," and Article 18 in turn lists the Basic Law itself as
law "in force in the Hong Kong Special Adinilnistrative Region." 84
Leave also aside the exception to the jurisdiction of the SAR
courts for "acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs,"8 5
which exception could conceivably be used in the way that the
political question doctrine is used in the United States. to avoid
adjudication of certain sensitive issues of foreign or military
policy. The doctrine could also be limited to the way it is used in
Britain.
Thus Professor Wesley-Smith finds the following
common law limitations to be "apparent on the face of" Article 19
of the Basic Law:
[Dieclarations of war and peace, recognition of foreign governments
and envoys, or determinations of the extent of Chinese territory are
matters outside the courts' purview. This is the Intergovernmental
act of state doctrine, and it is properly supplemented by executive

certificates in discovering the true view of the executive
government. Acts of state against Individuals will continue to be
possible (or act of state as a defence will continue to be available)

83.
84.
85.

IcL art. 39.
Id. arts. 84. 18.
A at art. 19.
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only when the action complained of occurs outside the territory in
relation to foreigners': decisions of the Central People's Government
in the realm of defence and foreign affairs which directly impinge
upon the rights of persons within the SAR must comply with SAR
law, and the courts may adjudicate any disputes arising from
86
them.

Assume then, that the SAR gets a wise, objective, and
independent Court of Final Appeal with the power to apply the
Basic Law directly in a case before it, and the CFA finds the act of
state limitation not to apply. Even with all of this. the court is
bound expressly by the interpretation of the Basic Law of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.
No
matter how powerful the reasoning of the court to the effect that
Article 27 prohibits the government action at issue, the Standing
Committee can simply interpret the Basic Law not to extend so
far. 8 7
Even if very stretched or constrained, tortured or
unprecedented, this interpretation of the Basic Law is controlling
under the words of Article 158, which "vests" interpretative power

in the Standing Committee. Now an objective reading, the very
linchpin of the power-such as it may be-to conform practice to
words, requires acceptance of the politicized meaning. In short,
the legal check is no check at all since the very source for legal
pressure to conform to the written constitution contains the basis
for effective violation.
In the example, assume the CFA is asked to find that the
punishment violates Article 27. The conclusion requires an
interpretation of Article 27 to that effect.
Assume (as a
hypothesis, not a prediction) that the Standing Committee simply
interprets "freedom of speech" not to include speech that
contravenes national policy or potentially destabilizes the political
equilibrium of the People's Republic. and that more specifically,
the speech is not protected by Article 27 as interpreted by the
Committee. What then is the wise, analytical, independent, and
courageous court to do? The words of the Basic Law, the very
foundation for any argument that the speech is protected, would
require the judges to accept the interpretation of the Standing
Committee.
These hypotheticals are not used to suggest that the People's
Republic will necessarily distort the Basic Law in this way, but
rather to show that because of the locus of final interpretive

86.

WESLEY-SMITH, supranote 36, at 106 (emphasis added).

87.

Compare the description by Owen Fiss of how the Standing Committee

might treat an issue of freedom of speech under the Chinese Constitution, Article
35 of which provides for freedom of speech for PRC citizens. Fiss, supra note 75,
at 497-98.
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authority, it avails an observer little to apply legal analysis to
determine the content of the Basic Law. One could look at the
words, evaluate the intent of the drafters, invoke natural law,
look at precedent, analyze logically, and so forth, all to determine
an interpretation of the Basic Law. One could do so with the
implicit assumption that the courts of the SAR will (or should)
replicate that reasoning to come to the same conclusion. One
could expect a wise and independent CFA to replicate such
reasoning, and thus one could use legal analysis to anticipate the
real and effective allocation of power within the SAR. But there is
little if any basis for expecting the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress to replicate such reasoning. There Is
no history of the Standing Committee applying anything contrary
to the then-current policy line of the Chinese Communist Party.
Within the constitutional system, then. there is little legal
basis for anticipating what the effective allocation of power will
be. This is not to argue that the SAR will not operate within the
letter of the Basic Law, but only to state that the domestic system
itself can have little if any force in impelling the SAR government
in that direction. The government of the People's Republic may
see the benefit of administering the SAR in a fashion that
comports very closely to a fair reading of the Basic Law. Doing so
would encourage productive Hong Kong residents to stay in Hong
Kong and would encourage business interests to continue to use
Hong Kong as a financial center.8 8
Doing so would also
strengthen the negotiating position of the People's Republic
government with the Taiwan authorities in any reunification
talks.8 9

Such political interests, as noted, would have to be

weighed against the need for control and stability within the
Chinese political system. How these factors and other political
factors are balanced cannot be predicted by constitutional legal
analysis.
V. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
On the other hand, while the domestic legal system Is
unlikely to have any weight in conforming the effective allocation
of power to the written allocation of power, the international legal
system may have some weight to that effect. This is because the
written constitution of Hong Kong, the Basic Law, was passed to
implement (in part) obligations under a bilateral international
agreement, the Joint Declaration. Many key provisions of the

88.
89.

See Henderson, supranote 32, at 535.
IcL at 537-38.
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Basic Law are taken directly from the Joint Declaration. To a
large extent then, the Basic Law is guaranteed by treaty in a way
that is distinct from most constitutions. The treaty, unlike the
Basic Law, has no provision giving one party the power to
interpret its meaning. Presumably, therefore, it has an objective,
or at least mutually accessible, meaning. Lawyers, then. can
evaluate whether one action or another on the part of the PRC
following handover complies with the treaty. As a treaty, the
Joint Declaration will bind legally if (1) treaties really bind legally,
(2) the PRC in particular "feels" bound, and (3) the British
Government demands compliance. Each of these is discussed
below.
A. Legally Binding Power of Treaties
Are treaties "legally binding"? At one level, the question is a
philosophical one about the nature of law. If a rule requires a
third-party enforcement agency in order to "bind," then
international law is arguably not "law" at all.9 ° On the other
hand, if each nation finds it in its interest to comply with certain
basic rules in order to be able to insist that other nations comply
with the same rules, we can call the system a "binding" one, even
without a third-party enforcement agency. 9 1 The system "binds"
in the precise sense that nations will (at least much of the time)
comport with the rule when doing so would otherwise be against
their particular interest. They do so in order to preserve the

ability to demand that other nations comply with respect to them.
Whether or not such a system is "law" in its purest form, it is a
system of binding obligations that is referred to by diplomats as
law, since it binds in the sense described, and since diplomats
treat it as something objectively ascertainable.
Even most positivist legal theorists can accept written
international agreements as creating rules of international law,
since it is hard to argue that nations do not at least hesitate to
violate treaties, even when compliance is otherwise entirely
against their interests. Protests against alleged violations are
generally met with explanations of how the act is not a violation,
or that the treaty is not in effect, rather than assertions of the
right to violate treaties at will. Nonetheless, those with strongly

90.
See Anthony D'Amato, Is InternationalLaw Really "Lcuni'," 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1293 (1985) (discussing whether "enforcement power" is necessarily the
hallmark of the concept of "law").
91.
Id. at 1303, 1312-14; see also John M. Rogers, A Way to Think About
International Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIE YA 611-16 (Ronald St.J.
MacDonald ed.. 1994).
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positivist backgrounds may challenge the statement that states
are ever really affected in their actions by treaty obligations alone.
For instance, some Chinese students once asked me for an
example of when a nation had acted differently solely because of
a treaty obligation. The clearest example to come to mind was
Britain's decision to hand Hong Kong back to China based on the
expiration of the lease term for the New Territories of Hong
Kong. 9 2 British policy has been to decolonize around the world In
the last few decades, but Britain has pretty consistently refused
to decolonize against the wishes of the inhabitants. Thus. both In
Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, where Spain and Argentina
respectively claim the territory in question, the primary sticking
point has been the refusal of the inhabitants to be turned over to
the mainland state. 93 Today, neither territory is of particular
strategic or economic benefit to Britain, but Britain has permitted
its relations with European Union partner Spain to suffer, 9 4 and
even fought a war with Argentina, to preserve control over these
territories pending local acquiescence in a handover.
What is different about Hong Kong? Indeed, Hong Kong
would seem of enormously greater value to Britain than Gibraltar
or the Falkland Islands. Moreover, the potential for disrupting
Britain's national interests seems far greater when the PRC takes
over Hong Kong than if democratic Spain were to take over
Gibraltar or Argentina were to take over the remote Falkland
Islands. The only real difference is the treaty of 1898 that
effectively terminates Britain's right to most of the territory of
what is now the colony of Hong Kong. In other words, treaty law
operates to control what likely would be a different policy.

This is not to say that all states comply with all treaties to
which they are parties. The much more modest claim is that
states, to obtain the value of other states complying with clearly
binding obligations, find an independent interest with substantial
and sometimes dispositive weight, in complying with such
obligations. It is in this sense that treaties "bind." At the
international level, it really makes little difference what the
internal constitution of a state is. Externally, the state still has
an interest in being perceived as trustworthy. Otherwise the

92.

The second Convention of Peking, which came into operation on July 1,

1898, leased the New Territories (the greater territorial part of the present Colony
of Hong Kong) to Britain for only 99 years. WEsLEY-SMITH, supranote 36, at 26.
93.
With respect to Gibraltar, see Simon J. Lincoln, Note, The Legal Status
of Gibraltar:Whose Rock Is ItAnyway?, 18 FoRDHAM IN'rL L.J. 285, 297-300 (1994).
94.
Id. at 288-89.
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benefit from
other, especially future, agreements may be
95
threatened.
Accordingly, there is a basis for expecting a similar effect to
operate for the government of China, regardless of its internal
legal structure. China enters into bilateral and multilateral
treaties, and treats them with seriousness.
It responds to
allegations of treaty violation with denial rather than assertion of
the right to violate.
It demands compliance with bilateral
obligations in its favor.
In short, it acts as part of the
international legal system, and has shown serious interest in
continuing to do so.
B. The PRC's Treatment of the JointDeclaration

The next question asks whether the government of the PRC
treats the Joint Declaration as a binding legal obligation? 9 6 One
argument against treating it as a valid international obligation
would be that Hong Kong was never validly British in the first
place due to inequality in the nineteenth century treaties of
cession and lease, 9 7 and thus. that the British cannot impose
binding conditions on its return. The idea that Hong Kong was
never validly British is deeply ingrained in China. 9 8 If from the
Chinese perspective all British control of Hong Kong pursuant to
nineteenth century treaties was illegal. it could be argued that
relinquishment of control was required without condition, and
any condition is arguably not Britain's to demand.
Like a
promise made to a kidnapper, it is not enforceable at law. While
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-widely accepted in
large part as reflective of customary international law-does not
demand consideration in order for treaty obligations to be
binding, it at least admits of the possibility that coerced
95.
See James Boyd White's description of how this interest was reflected
in the actions of ancient Greek city-states. JAMES BOYD WHrrE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING 66, 80-81 (1984).
96.
See generally Paul Vitrano. Hong Kong 1997: Can the People's Republic
of China Be Compelled to Abide by the Joint Declaration?,28 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L.
& Econ. 445 (1995): Henderson, supranote 30, at 510.
97.
See Vitrano, supranote 96, at 450.
98.
Once while lecturing to graduate students at a highly regarded law
school in central China, I- was asked whether I thought that countries really
complied with treaties when it was against their interest. When I gave the British
handover of Hong Kong as an example of treaty compliance against interest, the
response of the Chinese law students was not what I might have logically
anticipated: that Britain found it in its interest to turn Hong Kong over, in order to
keep good relations with China. Instead, the immediate response (with others

nodding heads and murmuring agreement) was that the treaties giving Hong Kong
to Britain were invalid treaties, without legally binding content in the first place.
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agreements are not binding. 9 9 A similar argument could have
been made that the United States was not bound to comply with
undertakings made with Iran to obtain release of illegally held
diplomatic hostages. The Chinese have been the leading advocate
of the doctrine that imposed "unequal" treaties are not
binding.1 0 0
It would be a relatively short step to say that
undertakings made to lift such treaties are similarly not binding,
and that compliance is simply a matter of comity or discretion.
No such argument has been asserted by the Chinese
Government, although if the argument were to be made, it would
not make sense to make it until after the handover.10
There
have been some suggestions, however, to the effect that what
China does in Hong Kong after the handover is a domestic
matter, not subject to interference by Britain.1 0 2

On the other

hand, violation of the Joint-Declaration would undermine China's
reputation as a reliable treaty partner. Of course, the degree of
violation would affect the degree to which the reputation Is
undermined.
Small or technical violations, or violations of
ambiguous terms, would damage China's reputation for honoring
treaties far less than wholesale or egregious violations. That this
dynamic exists suggests that there is a legal push that will to a
certain extent steer China toward compliance with the Joint

Declaration.
So viewed, the lack-of-consideration and unequal treaty
argument is of little weight, just as in domestic contract law the
relinquishment of a disputed claim amounts to consideration. 10 3
If a treaty settling a pre-existing dispute can be violated because
the other party is said to be wrong on the merits of the preexisting dispute, it would be next to impossible to achieve
settlement of such disputes. All peace treaties would be in
danger. The United States complied with the requirements of the
agreements resolving the hostage crisis for the obvious, if
unstated, reason that noncompliance would make it difficult to
resolve future crises by agreement. What "binds" then, is the
shared international need for a system of binding agreements.
The need is equally present when the parties are settling a
dispute.
The PRC, thus, has a legal interest in complying with the
Joint Declaration, above and apart from political interests that

99.
23, 1969,
100.
101.
102.
103.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
art. 52, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Vitrano, supranote 96, at 452.
See Henderson, supranote 32, at 519.
See Vitrano, supranote 96. at 452, n.52.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 71 & 74 (1981).
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might lead it to do so. 10 4 Of course, as with any treaty there is

the possibility of noncompliance.
But lawyers who accept that international law "binds" in the
sense described should expect that China is more likely to
comply with the terms of the Joint Declaration as an
international agreement than if it were, for example, a mere
statement of policy of the Chinese Government. If this is true,
international law, in addition to purely political factors, may
have some predictive value in determining what the constitutional
system of Hong Kong will be.
International law recognizes that treaties, particularly
territorial settlement treaties. may give one state the power to
protect the interests of nationals of another state. For example, it
is not unusual to find bilateral cession treaties that protect
inhabitants of ceded territory, notwithstanding that the
inhabitants have become nationals of the nation to which the
territory was ceded. Thus, the Treaty of Paris ceding Puerto Rico
from Spain to the United States provided that the cession:
cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments,
ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories
renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever
1 05
nationalitysuch individuals may be.

Similarly, in a 1923 Advisory Opinion. the Permanent Court of
International Justice held that a treaty between Germany and
Poland regarding territory turned over to Poland after World War I
protected the interests of formerly German domiciliaries who had
0 6
acquired Polish nationality. 1
C. GreatBritain'sInsistence on Compliance
As in any bilateral treaty, if one party waives its rights, or
chooses not to enforce them, then the legal incentive to comply is
gone. The question here is whether Britain will insist on the
PRC's compliance with the Joint Declaration in the years
following July, 1997. The official British position is that the Joint

104.
105.

See supratext accompanying notes 88-89.
Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. VIII, 30 Stat. 1754,

1758 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church,
210 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1908), relied in part on this treaty to hold that ownership of
certain property in Puerto Rico remained in the Roman Catholic Church,
106. Advisory Opinion No. 6. German Settlers in Poland, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 6, at 6-7, 36-37.
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Declaration is a treaty, binding as such under public
international law.1 0 7 The British government has also stated that
it will insist on Chinese compliance.1 0 8 Of course it is a political
question whether Britain will in fact do so,10 9 and therefore
beyond the scope of this Article. Britain's stated intent to insist
on compliance, however, coupled with China's interest in being
seen as a state that honors treaty obligations, warrant assessing
the future of Hong Kong's legal system as an international legal
matter.
D. Possible Third State Role in Compliance
There is also the possibility that third states will insist upon
Chinese compliance with the Joint Declaration.
The United

States has adopted legislation designed to encourage the Chinese
government to comply with the Joint Declaration."10
In
particular, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992
proclaims the United States recognition of the role Hong Kong
plays culturally and economically in the world economy. The Act
recognizes Hong Kong as "fully autonomous" in terms of Its
abilities to engage in commerce, enter into treaties, and maintain
diplomatic relations. The Act also declares Congress' and the
President's respective wishes to see full implementation of the
provisions of the Joint Declaration, and provides for a reporting
system to keep the U.S. government informed of the transition
from British to Chinese control.
The Act states that
democratization is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy,
and that the principle will continue to apply to Hong Kong after
June, 1997. Finally, the Act expresses that:
[t]he human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great
importance to the United States and are directly relevant to United
States interests in Hong Kong. A fully successful transition In the

107. Giles Hewitt & Peter Lim, Patten'sFarewell Speech Condemned in China
and Hong Kong, Agence France-Presse, Oct. 3, 1996: Hong Kong--Major Vows to
ProtectPost-1997Rights. Facts on File World Digest, Mar. 28, 1996, at 210, F3: Ian
Black & Andrew Higgins, Rijklnd Accuses China of Treaty Breach--Plan to Scrap
Hong Kong Elected Legislature Provokes Thinly Veiled Threats from Britain,
Guardian, Dec. 21, 1996, at 3.
108. Giles Hewitt & Peter Lim, Agence France-Presse, Oct. 3, 1996; Hong
Kong--Major Vows to ProtectPost-1997 Rghts, Facts on the File World Digest, Mar.
28, 1996; Ian Black & Andrew Higgins, Ryi~lnd Accuses China of Treaty Breach-Plan to Scap Hong Kong Elected Legislature Provokes Thinly Veiled Threats from
Britain,Guardian, Dec. 21, 1996.
109.
Governor Patten has shown reluctance to take up a democratic party
proposal that he urge Britain to raise such issues In the United Nations. Patten
Cold on Complainingto UN Security Council, HONG KONG STANDARD, Feb. 28, 1997.
110.

(1992).

United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-32
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exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong must safeguard human
rights in and of themselves. Human rights also serve as a basis for
Hong Kong's continued economic prosperity. 111

However, as a nonparty to the Joint Declaration. the United
States suffers from a lack of legal interest in making any protests
(or reprisals) on the basis of international obligations to the
United States. It is possible for bilateral treaties to provide
international law rights to third parties. 1 2 However, it would be
difficult to argue that the United States is a third-party
beneficiary of the Joint Declaration, 1 13 since its terms do not
1 14
appear directly to protect the interests of foreign states.
Nonetheless, there is a way in which third-party concern about
compliance with the Joint Declaration is legally relevant. The
mechanism for "enforcing" international law, and treaty law in
particular. is largely the need to be perceived internationally as a
reliable treaty partner. Violations of a treaty with one bilateral
treaty partner could undermine the ability to enter into treaties
with other potential treaty partners. In particular, the continued
ability to enter into treaty obligations with the United States is of
value to the PRC. 1 15 Noncompliance with obligations toward
Britain can only hurt this ability,
The bottom line is that, with respect to any issue of Hong
Kong constitutional law, it can be looked at it in different ways. A
legal analysis of the Basic Law will provide insight into what the
written constitution says. It can help us contemplate its beauty

111. 22 U.S.C. § 5701(b).
112. Vienna Convention. supra note 99, art. 36. 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341.
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATiONAL LAW 34, 62-64 (1993). For
extensive treatment, see Jonathan I. Charney. Third State Remedies in
IntemationalLaw. 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 57 (1989).
113. Professor Charney argues, however, that a stronger argument for thirdparty remedies in international law may be present when there are "directly
injured states with the interest and ability to seek a remedy, but blatant and
widespread violations of the law committed by a powerful state or group of states
may have created a situation such that the injured states alone are not able to
effectuate a remedy." Chamey, supranote 112, at 96.
114. There is the possible exception of the terms of the Joint Declaration
dealing with pre-handover treaties with third states. Joint Declaration, para.
3(10). supranote 20. Even if these terms provide legal rights to third parties. this
does not mean that other provisions of the Joint Declaration, for instance
providing for 50 years of a capitalist system, legislative elections. etc.. somehow
provide such third party rights.
115. New international obligations- on the part of China to take certain
domestic actions, for instance, were the means by which Sino-U.S. trade wars
over copyright infringements were avoided. See Agreement Regarding Intellectual
Property Rights. Feb. 26, 1995, U.S.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 881. If the United States
assumed that such undertakings were meaningless. it would be impossible to
resolve the disputes in such a manner.
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and understand its intent, but it may not tell us much about
what the effective allocation of power will be. An international
law analysis of the Joint Declaration, in contrast, may give us
some information, albeit far from dispositive, about the effective
allocation of power. Finally, if we think of a constitution as a
referent to which elements in the system have agreed, the Basic
Law is still handicapped by its grant of interpretive power to a
political body. Conversely, the Joint Declaration is likely to
continue to be the point of reference for public international legal
arguments.

VI. POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS AND THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF
HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTION

With this framework in mind, this section examines two
structural aspects of the impending Hong Kong constitution. The
Basic Law assigns executive, legislative, and judicial powercategories of goverment power that are familiar to lawyers In
constitutional systems around the world. The assignment of
judicial power is discussed to some extent above. Therefore. this
section briefly discusses the assignment of executive and
legislative power under the new Hong Kong constitution. The
particular question addressed will appear to many foreigners as
the central one: to what extent will these branches be responsive

to the wishes of the people of Hong Kong? The discussion here
attempts to be careful in distinguishing (1) how the written
constitution answers this question, (2) what the real answer is
likely to be (effective constitution), and (3) the extent to which
there is an agreement that answers the question.
A. The Role of PoliticalResponsiveness
"Democracy" is a word that has so many different meanings
that it is difficult to discuss carefully whether a constitutional
scheme is "democratic." The German Democratic Republic for
instance was "democratic" in a sense foreign to most Americans.
The "democracy" protesters in Tian An Men Square in 1989 were
subjected to the criticism that they did not "really understand"
democracy. Rather than try to distill meanings of the term, it
may be helpful to identify a characteristic of political institutions
that is often, but not always associated with the concept of
"democracy."
That characteristic may be called political
responsiveness. When political institutions react quickly to the
desires of the people and institutions of a society, those
institutions have a high level of political responsiveness.
In
contrast, if institutions are immune from the desires of the people
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and institutions of the society, this is the opposite extreme of no
political responsiveness. There is also a distinction between
institutions that by their structure are politically responsive, and
those whose incumbents happen to be more or less politically
responsive. An elected legislature is structured to have a high
degree of political responsiveness, though in fact its members
may not be so, as in the instance of a corrupted legislature. On
the other hand, a hereditary absolute monarch may in fact be
politically responsive, for instance, if the monarch conforms his
or her royal actions to the will of the people, but the structure of
such an institution does nothing to insure that this be the case.
What is the advantage of institutions that are structured to
be politically responsive? It is hard to defend the position that an
increase in political responsiveness corresponds directly with an
increase in wise decisionmaking. Even assuming that we can
agree on what type of decisionmaking is "wise," or good for the
public, it is always possible that a small minority will be able to
make the determination better than the people and institutions of
the territory at large. Perhaps the small minority is better
educated, more experienced, or has greater access to the source
of wisdom. Arguments can be made for having a highly educated
absolute monarch, or for rule by a single party whose members
are bound by a coherent economic or religious theory. Very
unresponsive governments can perhaps do some good things that
could not be done by more responsive governments. The drastic
methods used to curb population growth in China are perhaps an
example. But very unresponsive governments can do things that
are extraordinarily bad and correspondingly impossible under a
politically responsive regime. Examples might be government
policies directly resulting in mass starvation, or government
actions encouraging widespread teenage abuse of teachers and
destruction of books. Avoiding such bizarre results is an
important policy underlying political responsiveness.
A deeper, related argument for political responsiveness is the
stability to be derived from avoiding civil unrest, and ultimately,
avoiding civil war.
Institutions that are structured to be
politically responsive should have an increased likelihood of
actually being so. And institutions not so structured run the risk
of being very unresponsive.
Institutions that are in fact
unresponsive obviously can instill social unrest. This can be in
the form of flouting of laws, subversion or sabotage of the
government, dislocation of populations, and at the extreme, civil
war.
Avoiding these is the underlying benefit from a
constitutional system that responds to, and is reflective of, the
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interests and desires of the people and institutions in the
1 16
country.

How politically responsive to the people and institutions of
Hong Kong will the new executive and legislature of Hong Kong
be? Using the various senses of "constitution" to essay an
answer to this question requires a preliminary look at
developments in the corresponding branches of the colonial
government. These developments are briefly summarized here.
B. Executive Power in Hong Kong's ColonialGovernment
The executive power is exercised by the British Government,
largely through the power delegated to the colonial Governor,
appointed technically by the Queen, but in actuality by her
government, i.e., the British Prime Minister. 1 7 The Governor's
office is created by the Letters Patent, and his powers are
statutory in the sense that he is limited to powers granted him by
the Letters Patent, British Parliamentary Acts. and laws of Hong
Kong."I 8 He is the head of the "administration" in Hong Kong.
Following Prime Minister Major's victory in the 1992 British
elections, he appointed Mr. Chris Patten as Governor of Hong
Kong. Mr. Patten had been a close associate of Mr. Major in
Parliament, but Patten had lost his particular seat in the
elections. 19 The Governor is advised and assisted by a cabinetlike body, the Executive Council (ExCo), which consists of three
ex officio members and other appointed members (currently
0
twelve). 12

C. Developments in Legislative Power
The British Parliament retains the power to legislate for Hong
Kong, but it has also statutorily delegated such power to Hong
Kong's Legislative Council.' 2 1 The composition of LegCo is set
out in the Letters Patent, and elections are governed by local
ordinance. 12 2 Over the last fifty years, the LegCo has been
constituted in ways that have been structurally more politically
responsive.

116.

See Rogers & Molzon, supranote 73, at 1004 & 1004 n.29.

117.

WEsLEY-SMrrH, supranote 36, at 37.

118.

Id. at 37-38.

119.

Hong Kong Gets Last Governor. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 25. 1992, at

120.

WESLEY-SMITH,

A4.

121.

supranote 36, at 123-24.
Formally, it is the Governor who legislates, with the advice and consent

of the LegCo, but this is a technicality. Id. at 154.
122.

Id. at 154-55.

HONG KONG'S CONSTIITI'ION

19971

In 1947, for instance, the Legislative Council consisted of six
ex officio members (the Governor, the Chief Secretary, the
Attorney-General, the Secretary for Home Affairs, the Financial
Secretary, and the Commander of British Forces), three
nominated officials (representing the departments of Urban
Services, Public Works, and Medical and Health Services). and
seven nominated persons who were not otherwise officials
("unofficials").1 2 3 Thus, the entire body was nominated (formally
by the Secretary of State in London, but in practice and effect by
the Governor). 124 Furthermore, the official members were bound
to vote as the Governor directed them unless they obtained a
specific release.12 5
Because of this composition. the
administration was always granted a majority.
By 1976, this had changed. The Council had grown in size.
and the number of nominated unofficials had grown relative to
the number of nominated officials. The body consisted of five ex
officio members (the Commander of British Forces no longer
26
included), fifteen officials, and twenty-two unofficials.1
Although all members were still appointed, appointments were
beginning to be made from sectors of society which had not been

represented before. 12 7 Over the next few years, the diversity of
the body became even more evident.
Then, in 1985, the Legislative Council included its first
elected members.' 2 8 Although the twenty-four elected members
had won their seats by indirect elections, this was still a marked
increase in the representative nature of the Legislative Council.
The fifty-seven member Council at that point also included
twenty-two appointed members and eleven officials (including the
29
President). 1
It was just a year earlier that agreement on the handover of
Hong Kong was reached between Britain and China. The Joint
Declaration provides that:
The

legislative

power

of

the

Hong

Kong

Special

Administrative Region shall be vested in the legislature of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. The legislature may on its
own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the
Basic Law and legal procedures. and report them to the Standing

123.
NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 126, 127
(3d ed. 1981).
124.
Id. at 127.
125.
Id. at 129.
126.
Id. at 126-29.
127.
Id. at 129.
128.

NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 114 (5th

ed. 1995).
Id.
129.
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Committee of the National People's Congress for the record. Laws
enacted by the legislature which are in accordance with the Basic
13 0
Law and legal procedures shall be regarded as valid.
The Joint Declaration also provides that "[t]he legislature of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted
by elections." 13 1
These provisions and others in the Joint
Declaration are to be stipulated in a Basic Law to be promulgated
32
by the National People's Congress of the PRC.1
The Basic Law was drafted by a working group of the Chinese
National People's Congress appointed in 1985.133 A first draft
was published in 1988. Following a consultation period and the
adoption of some amendments, it was adopted by the National
People's Congress in 1990.134 It provides that the SAR Legislative
Council will be "the legislature of the Region," and provides that it
'shall be constituted by election." 13 5 The method for forming the
Council "shall be specified in the light of the actual situation" in
the SAR and "in accordance with the principle of gradual and
orderly progress." 13 6 The "ultimate aim is the election of all the
13 7
members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage."
The specific method for forming the Legislative Council is
contained in an annex to the Basic Law. It provides that the
Council will be composed of sixty members. 13 8 During the first
two-year term, the council will have twenty members elected by
geographical constituencies, ten by an election committee, and
thirty by functional constituencies. 13 9 The second term council
will have the following ratio: thirty functional/six election
committee/twenty-four geographical, and the third term council
0
will have thirty functional/thirty geographical. 14
LegCo, as actually constituted in 1988, consisted of the
Governor, the three principal officials of the administration (Chief
Secretary, Attorney-General, and Finance Secretary), twenty
appointed members, twelve members elected by local councils
and boards (the Urban Council, the Regional Council, and

130. Joint Declaration, supra note 20, Annex I, Part II.
131. Id. Annex I, Part I.
132. Id. art. 3(12).
133. WESLEY-SMITH. supranote 36, at 66.
134. Id.
135. Basic Law, supra note 35, arts. 66, 68.
136. Id. art. 68.
137. Id.
138. Id. pt. I, Annex II, para. 1.
139. Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the
Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. para. 6. 3d Sess.. 7th National People's
Congress, Apr. 4, 1990.
140. Basic Law, supranote 35, Annex II, Part I, para. 1.
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District Boards), and fourteen members elected by functional
constituencies. 141 This was modified to include directly elected
members in 1991.
Under the law applicable to the 1991
constitution of LegCo, it consisted of the Governor and three
principal officers, eighteen appointees of the Governor, twentyone members elected from functional constituencies, and
eighteen directly elected members. 142
In order to understand further developments regarding the
legislative power, it is necessary at this point to examine how the
executive branch is to be constituted under the Basic Law.
Under the Basic Law, the Chief Executive will wield the executive
power in the SAR, make the important administrative and judicial

appointments, and be the head of the administration. 14 3 He is to
be appointed by the Central People's Government "by election or
through consultations held locally." t 4 4 As in the case of the
Legislature, the method for selection the Chief Executive "shall be
specified in the light of the actual situation [in the SARI and in
accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress." 145
Additionally, the Basic Law states that the "ultimate aim is the
selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in
accordance with democratic procedures." 14 6 Annex I of the Basic
Law provides that the Chief Executive will be elected by a
"broadly representative Election Committee." t 4 7 Each member of
the committee may nominate only one candidate, and the
members will elect a Chief Executive designate by secret ballot on
a one-person-one-vote basis from among those candidates who
gained nominations from more than 100 members of the
committee.
The annex further prescribes the size and
composition of the Election Committee.

141.
The 21 functional constituency seats in 1991 were allocated for
Instance to companies that are members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce,
companies that are members of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, banks,
trade unions, doctors and dentists, engineers, companies that are engaged in real
estate development and constitution, etc. MINERS, supra note 128, at 116-17.
The number of electors in each functional constituency ranged from a few
hundred to 50,000 (teachers). Id. at 117.
142. 'I\vo members were elected from each of nine geographical
constituencies with an average of 200,0000 registered voters. MINERS. supranote
128, at 117.
143.
Basic Law, supra note 35, art. 43, para. 1.

144.

Id. at art. 45, para. 1.

145.

Id. art. 45, para. 2.

146.
147.

Id.
Id. Annex I, para. 1.
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The term of office of the Election Committee shall be five
years. 148 The Election Committee shall be composed of 800
members from the following sectors:
Industrial, commercial and financial sectors:
The professions:
Labour, social services, religious and other
sectors:
Members of the Legislative Council,
representatives of district based
organizations, Hong Kong deputies to
the National People's Congress, and
representatives of Hong Kong members
of the National Committee of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative
Conference:

200
200
200

200

The annex also states that "[clorporate bodies in various
sectors shall, on their own, elect members to the Election
Committee, in accordance with the number of seats allocated and
the election method as prescribed by" an election law to be
enacted in the SAR and "in accordance with the principles of
14 9
democracy and openness."
The Basic Law is supplemented by four National People's
Congress Decisions. These Decisions concern, among other
things, the procedures for the formation of the first government
and Legislative Council. These procedures differ somewhat from
the standard procedures described above.
The "Decision of the National People's Congress on the
Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region" states that "the first Government and the first Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
formed in accordance with the principles of state sovereignty and
smooth transition." 5 0 The Decision describes the creation of the
Preparatory Committee and the Selection Committee.
The
Preparatory Committee is responsible for "preparing the
establishment" of a 400-member Selection Committee.1 5 1 The
Preparatory Committee is appointed by the Standing Committee

148.

Id. Annex I, para. 2.

149.

Id. Annex I, para. 3.

150.
Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the
Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, para. 1, 3d. Sess., 7th National People's
Congress. Apr. 4, 1990.

151.

Id. para. 3.
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of the National People's Congress.
composed as follows:

The Selection Comrnittee is

Industrial, commercial, and financial
sectors:
The professions:
Labour, grass-roots, religious, and other
sectors:
Former political figures, Hong Kong
deputies to the National People's
Congress, and representatives of
Hong Kong members of the National
Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference:

25 percent
25 percent
25 percent

25 percent

52

The Selection Committee will recommend the candidate for
the first Chief Executive "through local consultations or through

nomination and election after consultations," and report the
recommended 5 candidate
to the Central People's Government for
3
appointment.,
In October 1992, Governor Patten made proposals to
increase the political responsiveness of the LegCo. l5 4 These
included lowering of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen,
adoption of a single-vote, single-seat system for the geographical
constituencies,15 5 and greatly increasing the electorate in the
functional constituencies such that all eligible workers could vote
for ftmctional representatives. 5 6 These and related proposals
were designed to "extend democracy while working within the
Basic Law," t5 7 but have been vehemently challenged by the
Chinese government as inconsistent with the Basic Law and
contrary to certain Sino-British "understandings."
The
Administration nonetheless obtained their passage and
implemented them in 1995. The 1995 election came very close to
giving the Democratic Party led by Martin Lee a majority in the
58
Legislative Council. 1

152.

Id.

153. Id. para. 4.
154. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 36, at 157.
155. In the previous election, larger districts had each elected twvo members.
See supra note 142.
156. Id. at 158-59.
157. Id. at 159.
158. In what was described as a decisive victory, the Democratic Party von
19 of the 25 seats they contested. They were joined by several other victors who
supported the party on many key issues. Thus, the total number of pro-

democratic seats was between 27 and 29, out of a total of 60 Council seats. Peter
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The Chinese Government's position has been that LegCo, so
constituted, is a violation of the Basic Law, and will be dissolved
immediately upon the handover of power. 15 9 In its place a
Provisional Legislature will exercise legislative power pending
installation of a legislature in conformity with the Basic Law. The
sixty members of the Provisional Legislature would be named by

the same Selection Committee that would name the Chief
Executive.
The Preparatory Committee was appointed by the Central
People's Government in January, 1996.160 No member of the
16 1
Democratic Party was included in the Preparatory Committee.
Likewise, after the announcement of China's intentions to create
a provisional legislature, the Democrats boycotted the nomination
process for the Selection Committee, and accordingly obtained no
62
appointments. 1
On December 11, 1996, the Selection Committee selected

Tung Chee Hwa as Chief Executive.1 63 At the time his name first
surfaced,

he was the choice of a very small part of the

electorate. 16 4 Tung is a businessman whose business interests
have been aided by the Chinese Government. 16 5
Tung has

Stein, Colony Voters' Message Is Clear.Reception Isn't, ASIAN WALL ST. J.. Sept. 19.
1995. at A3.
159.
In February. 1997. the New China fXinhual News Agency released a list
of laws that will cease to be effective from the handover in accordance with the
decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. List of
Existing Laws that China Will Scrap on 1 July, HONG KONG STANDARD, Feb. 24,
1997.
These laws included the Legislative Council (Electoral Provisions)
Ordinance, and the provisions on elections contained in the Urban Council
Ordinance, the Regional Council Ordinance, and the District Board Ordinance.

Id.
160. Mary Kwang, China to Hand Out 150 Appointments. STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), Jan. 26. 1996, at 22.
161.
Mary Kwang, HK Representatives for Post-'97 Panel Mostly Businessmen,
Straits Times (Singapore), Dec. 28, 1995. at 1.
162. Wang Hui Ling, Chinese Officials Defend HK Selection Committee,
Straits Times (Singapore), Nov. 5, 1996, at 17.
163. Eric Guyot & Craig S. Smith, Body Elects Tung Next Chiefof Territory.
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996, at 1.
164.
In a poll taken by the South China Morning Post less than one year
before the selection, Tung ranked last among the eight people listed. He received
less than half of one percent of support from the 606 respondents. Chris Yeung,
Anson Tops PoularityPoll, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 26, 1995, at 2.
165.
See Wang Hui Ling, Chinese Group Helped Me in 1986, says HK Chief
Exec Candidate, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 24, 1996 at 17 (reporting Tung's

revelation that his family shipping business was rescued from financial difficulties
in 1986 by a Chinese interest). Also reflective of Tung's pro-business stance were
his inner-cabinet appointments, which were given almost entirely to business
professionals. This move was welcomed by businesses but also criticized for its
overly homogenous nature. See Erik Guyot. Tung's Executive Council Seen Playing
Active Role. ASIAN WALL ST. J.. Jan. 27, 1997, at 5.
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avoided positions objectionable to the Chinese Government, such
166
as criticism of the Provisional Legislature.
The Selection Committee chose the members of the
Provisional Legislature on December 21, 1996.167 Although
thirty-three members of the current LegCo are members of the
Provisional Legislature, and the Democratic Party has the largest
faction in the current LegCo. no Democratic Party members were
named. 168 Furthermore, fifty-four of the Provisional Legislature's
sixty newly-elected members have worked in various capacities as
69
advisers for Beijing. 1

The U.K. Government has consistently opposed the
Provisional Legislature, and that body has until now, met only in
Shenzhen, a PRC city bordering on Hong Kong territory. 1 70 The1
17
meetings in Shenzhen were closed to the public and the media.
D. Form Versus Substance with Respect to PoliticalResponsibility
In form, the government will be responsive to the interests
and inclinations of the people and institutions of Hong Kong. The
Basic Law explicitly requires the election of the Legislative
Council, and supports steps toward its being constituted solely of
democratically elected members. The Basic Law also provides
that the Chief Executive, if not elected, will be appointed following

"consultations."

A legal argument could be made that such

consultations must be more than a sham; that the views of those
consulted should not be totally disregarded. The British practice
of consulting dominion governments prior to the appointment of
governors-general might be cited in support. Even though the
Chief Executive has been appointed without the formal assent of

166. See Linda Choy, Quiet Talks with China Favored Over Wrangling. SOUTH
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1996. at 7 (describing Tung as "plain about his proChina stance," and discussing his non-confrontational nature with regard to
China).
167. Long Running PoliticalStruggle Ends in Stalemate, HONG KONG STANDARD,
Dec. 22, 1996.
168. Eric Guyot, New Legislature Plans Shake-Up in Hong Kong. ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Dec. 23, 1996; see also Peter Stein, Conlony Voters' Message is Clear.
Reception Isn't,ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1995, at A3.
169. Members with Beying Connections in Mojority, HONG KONG STANDARD,
Dec. 22, 1996.
170. Clarence Tsui, Shower of Basic Law Booklets, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 26, 1997, at 4 (reporting that minutes before Provisional Legislature
members left for their first meeting in Shenzhen, activists showered the alley with
red booklets of the Basic Law, the implication being that as the members rode in
their carriages toward Shenzhen they "trampl[ed] the Basic Law").
171. Linda Choy & Angela Li. Media Denied Direct Access. SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 4.
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several elements in Hong Kong society, the government of the
SAR retains on paper substantial and significant elements of
political responsibility. The body with the legislative power could
be politically responsive, and could curtail through legislation the
most egregious actions of an extremely arbitrary or unreasonable
Chief Executive.
E. Portents of the Real Situation

The Chinese Government has taken a number of steps that
reflect resistance to institutionalized political responsibility in
Hong Kong. It has excluded Democratic Party members from all
aspects of the process of selecting leaders. It has refused to
accept the currently composed LegCo as an initial legislative
body. It has indirectly chosen a leader who has carefully towed
the PRC line on political responsiveness issues. It has aimed its
sharpest criticism
at proposals
for greater
political
responsiveness. Of course, particular actions might reflect the
particular level of political tension between Britain and China.
While these actions may also reflect temporary political

circumstances, there appears to be a consistent thread in
Chinese actions toward Hong Kong, at least since 1989. That
thread is adversity to democratic limits on the exercise of political
power by the Central government.
The Chinese Government has objected vigorously to steps
that increased the political responsibility of the LegCo. Objection
to the LegCo reforms has been continuous and strong. Senior
Chinese officials, including those responsible for Hong Kong
matters, will not meet with Governor Patten or even be seen with
him. The Chinese Government has adhered to its announced
intention to disband the elected LegCo immediately and put in its
place an unelected Provisional Legislature.
The Provisional
Legislature is particularly controversial since it appears to
contravene both the Joint Declaration requirement that "the
legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative region shall
be constituted by elections." 172
One might charitably attribute these objections to the
manner in which LegCo reforms were introduced, Le., without
private consultations to obtain the prior acceptance of the
Chinese government, and arguably in conflict with earlier private
understandings. But it is difficult not to get the impression that
it is the substance of the steps that the Chinese Government
finds objectionable.
If the Chinese, who have had limited
experience with legislative elections, can successfully participate

172.

Joint Declaration, supra note 20, Annex I, § I, para. 3.
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in LegCo elections, it is harder for the Chinese government to
justify a Chinese People's Congress that is effectively appointed.
Arguably the same concern motivated the intense opposition in
Beijing to the presidential election in Taiwan. In short, Chinese
elections in China threaten a fundamental tenet of the Central
Government in Beijing-continued power by the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party.
VII. THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION AS A RECONCILIATION OF

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL POWER

The words of the constitutional documents of the Hong Kong

SAR thus describe a level of political responsibility that may well
not reflect the way in which the government of Hong Kong will be
"constituted." But what of the political power that caused the
words to be inserted in the first place? In other words, why
should we not expect the very interests that caused protections to
be put in a charter or constitution to insist on a level of
compliance? When those interests subsequently come into
conflict, they may refer to the constitution as a rhetorical basis
for insisting on certain rights. Thus, if the factions and interests
that constitute a political entity agree on a certain allocation of
powers, a usurpation by one faction should anticipate at least
some political opposition from the faction that is not receiving the
benefit of the bargain that the written constitution reflects. One
should naturally look first, therefore, to the political forces that
negotiated for (or insisted upon) the particular power allocation
that the written constitution reflects. One could then determine
whether that force is sufficiently strong to insist upon power
allocations that work in its favor. For instance, if the U.S.
Constitution was in one respect an allocation of power between
large and small states of the Union, an assertion of power that
works to the detriment of small states might be opposed by those
small states as a constitutional violation. This is the previously
discussed sense in which a constitution can be observed a
referent for fundamental disputes. What is peculiar about the
Hong Kong constitution in this regard is that the power-allocating
documents were negotiated and entered into not by the various
factions and interests in the territory of Hong Kong, but rather by
two distant governments. It follows that in this sense of the word
"constitution," one should look at it as an agreement between
Britain and China, rather than as an agreement among the
powers, factions, and interests of Hong Kong. Thus, looking at
the constitution as a fundamental referent for disputes requires a
return to consideration of legal aspects of the Hong Kong
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constitution as an international law question-a question that
concerns the interpretation of a bilateral treaty.
It is difficult at this time to anticipate all of the treatyinterpretation arguments that might be made concerning whether
the actual procedures that will take place in Hong Kong will
conform to the Joint Declaration. This is because we do not
know exactly what will happen. This Article has already adverted
to the potential argument that the Joint Declaration creates no
continuing obligation by China toward the United Kingdom.
Additionally, this Article has suggested the difficulties that such a
hard line position might entail. Assuming, in contrast, a binding
obligation, there is room for dispute as to the extent of the
obligation.
How much political responsibility is actually
required?
Britain can argue that China is subject to an
international treaty obligation that the legisature of Hong Kong
SAR be "constituted by elections" 17 3 and that the requirement is
one of substance and not merely of form. A legislature that is
constituted by "election" of the Beijing Government would
accordingly violate China's international obligation. China could
argue that the particular elements of the current election law are

not required by the Joint Declaration, that it is impossible for
China to have an elected legislature in place on July 1, 1997, and
that, therefore, it is impossible immediately to constitute a
legislature by popular election. Treaty law does not require
impossibilities. 17 4 At the very least, Britain may demand that the
Legislature Council be constituted by popular election within a
reasonable time, certainly by 1999. How far the government of
the People's Republic will be willing to go in permitting "true"
elections at that time in order to appear in compliance with its
treaty obligations is not really possible to anticipate at this time.
VIII. CONCLUSION

What can be said then about the new Hong Kong
Constitution? The Basic Law as an implementation of the Joint
Declaration describes a structure that is reasonably politically
responsive. The superficiality of such a conclusion should be
obvious at this point. One simply cannot conclude that the Hong
Kong SAR will have a politically responsive government based
upon the written charters for that government. If "constitution"
means how the political power is actually "constituted," then the
conclusion has to be largely a political prediction. Such a

173.
174.

Id. Annex I.§ I.
Vienna Convention, supranote 99, art. 61.
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prediction may better be left to political scientists or historians
than to legal scholars. Finally, as a referent for international
legal arguments, however, the Joint Declaration-as an
international treaty-could serve Britain, and perhaps other
countries, as a basis for insisting upon a level of political
responsibility that otherwise might not occur. In short, the
international lawyer may have more to say about how politically
responsive the new Hong Kong government will be than the
constitutional lawyer. This makes the prospect of examining how
the Hong Kong government will develop a particularly interesting
one for those who argue about whether international law really
works. No matter how positively or negatively the situation
develops in Hong Kong, constitutional scholars and international
law scholars will have an objective lesson in how law works-or
does not.

